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This study investigates the potential impact of two 
environmental tax regimes on the movement of 
rural people to China’s cities. The study models the 
impact of a fuel tax and an output tax on the 
country’s economy to get a full picture of how they 
would affect people’s livelihoods and welfare, and 
how this would, in turn, affect rural-urban 
migration.  The study sheds light on the 
implications of future environmental taxes and how 
they would affect urbanization and “rural-urban” 
migration in China. 
The study finds that both proposed taxes would 
discourage the flow of migrants from China’s 
countryside to its cities. This would therefore 
exacerbate the current distortions in the country’s 
labour market, where there is a surplus of rural 
labour. A comparison of the impact of the two 
taxes shows the fuel tax to be more efficient in 
terms of reducing pollution emissions and their 
associated environmental and health impacts. It 
also produces less distortion in the rural-urban 
migration process than the output tax. The study 
therefore recommends that this would be the 
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For the past twenty years, the Chinese economy has achieved a growth rate 
averaging nearly 10% each year. However, this strong economic performance has been 
accompanied by severe environmental deterioration. To curb the rapid growth of air 
pollution, many environmental scholars are advocating an environmental tax policy, 
which has been extensively proved as an effective and efficient economic incentive 
instrument on pollution abatement by many OECD countries. However, a lot of literature 
on optimal environmental taxation in the “second-best setting” suggests that if labor 
market distortions are considered, an environmental tax policy will actually exacerbate 
pre-existing tax distortions in the economic system due to the negative “tax interaction 
effect”, thus driving up welfare costs associated with environmental tax reform.  
 
In previous literature on China’s environmental tax policy, inelastic labor 
market assumptions were typically assumed due to the large labor force in China, giving 
rise to a strong form “double dividend” result (This suggests that environmental taxes can 
be used to discourage environmental damage activities and reduce the efficiency costs of 
pre-existing tax distortions simultaneously.) This result was obtained only when positive 
welfare gains from the “revenue recycling effects” were accounted for, while “tax 
interaction effects” in the labor market were zero due to the inelastic labor supply 
assumption.1  
 
However, previous literature ignored the fact that in a transitional economy like 
China, because of the old household registration “hukou” system2 and other government 
constraints on migrations, peasants’ rural-urban migration behaviors are distorted and 
resulted in tremendous economic inefficiency in the allocation of labor resources 
spatially. Thus, there might be another type of “tax interaction effect” associated with the 
environmental tax in the second-best setting, which stems from the spatial allocation of 
urban and rural labor, i.e. migration, rather than from the entering or exiting behaviors in 
the labor market of western countries. 
 
To bridge this gap, this study examines how environmental tax policies affect 
“rural-urban” migration flow and associated labor market distortions in China, using a 
recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with two-
representative households (rural vs. urban). This study analyzes the impact of two sets of 
environmental taxes: fuel tax and output tax and finds that both of these discourage rural-
                                                 
1 The revenue recycling effect is the positive welfare impact from environmental taxation, if the tax 
revenues are recycled through cuts in marginal taxes of other pre-existing distortionary taxes, thus reducing 
the gross distortions or excess burden of the economic system (Terkla 1984; Lee and Misiolek 1986; Oates 
and Schwab 1988; Oates 1993; Repetto et al. 1992; Goulder 1998). The tax interaction effect suggests that 
environmental taxes would distort the factor market, the intermediate input market, or consumers’ choices 
of goods consumption, and bring negative tax interaction effects to offset the positive revenue recycling 
effect (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1994; Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, 
1997; Parry 1995, 1997; Goulder 1998).  
2 China’s “hukou” system, which originated in 1951, requires citizens to reside in their birthplace. It strictly 
restricts the mobility of the population, including rural to urban migration.  
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urban migration flow and exacerbate the current spatial labor distortions in China. By 
comparing the two tax policy regimes, the CGE model simulations suggest that fuel tax is 
more economically efficient than output tax in terms of reducing more pollution 
emissions and associated environmental health damages, and bringing about lower 




For the past two decades of economic reform and opening up, the Chinese 
economy has achieved a high growth rate averaging nearly 10% per year, increasing per 
capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 381 Yuan in 1978 to 14,040 Yuan in 2005, 
about nine times in real value terms.3 However, like many other transitional economies 
during industrialization, China’s economic growth is accompanied with severe 
environmental deterioration. According to the “State of the Environmental Report” in 
2005 (SEPA 2005), only 4% urban cities satisfy Grade I of the national standard, about 
56% in Grade II, and about 40% of the urban cities are in Grade III or lower. According 
to the World Bank, 16 out of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are located in China, -- 
the air is so polluted it causes 400,000 premature deaths every year.4 Based on a recent 
International Energy Agency (IEA) report (2006), China’s carbon emission levels will 
surpass those of the US before 2009 to become the biggest contributor to global 
warming5, almost ten years earlier than most people expected. With the rapid growth of 
automobile demand, urban air pollution is expected to be even worse in the next ten 
years. Currently, many environmental scholars are advocating the implementation of an 
economic incentive-based policy instrument, in particular an environmental tax policy to 
curb the rapidly growing air pollution in China.  Now the question is: What would be the 
impacts of an environmental tax policy on China’s economy? Surrounding this question 
is the hot debate on the “double dividend” hypothesis, which asserts that a green tax 
reform will not only improve environmental quality, but also increase non-environmental 
welfare (strong form) or at least lower the efficiency cost of the green tax reform 
(Bovenberg 1999). Recently some empirical CGE models suggest that the strong form 
“double dividend” hypothesis will hold in China (Garbaccio, Ho and Jorgenson 2000; Ho 
and Jorgenson 2007; Cao, Ho and Jorgenson 2005; He 2004). 
 However, a growing body of literature on optimal environmental taxation in 
the second-best setting suggests that if labor market distortions are considered, an 
environmental tax policy will actually exacerbate pre-existing tax distortions, the welfare 
gains from the revenue-neutral environmental tax reform might be lower and the “double 
dividend” hypothesis might not be valid (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Bovenberg and 
van der Ploeg 1994; Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, 1997; Parry 1995, 1997; Goulder 
1995,1998; Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, 2002). With the existence of a distorted labor 
tax, these literatures point out that the two general-equilibrium effects co-exist after the 
imposition of the environmental tax. The “revenue recycling effect” is the welfare gain 
                                                 
3 China Statistical Yearbook (2006) 
4 Hhttp://www.csun.edu/~vasishth/State_of_the_World's_Cities_2006_07.pdfH. 
5 World Energy Outlook 2006 (IEA, 2006)  
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by using the environmental tax revenue to replacing the more distortionary taxes such as 
capital and labor tax on factor income in the pre-existing tax system. The “tax interaction 
effect” is a welfare loss effect since the environmental taxes raise the price of the 
polluting goods, or in another sense raise the overall price level, resulting in a decline in 
real wages, thereby discouraging the labor supply in the “second-best world”6 (Goulder 
1995). Therefore, whether the “double dividend” hypothesis holds or not depends on the 
magnitude of the two opposing effects of the environmental tax. If the “revenue recycling 
effects” dominates the “tax interaction effect”, then the strong form “double dividend” 
hypothesis will hold. Conversely, if “tax interaction effect” is larger, the strong form 
“double dividend” is absent.    
Currently, the previous CGE models on environmental taxes in China all 
assume that the labor market as a whole is inelastic in China, and environmental tax 
reform will not drive distortions in the labor market. Therefore, only the welfare gains 
from the “revenue recycling effects” are accounted for and the “double dividend” 
becomes a common result. 
 However, there is another special type of labor market distortion which is 
widely ignored in previous CGE literature on environmental tax policies in China, that is, 
the spatial labor market distortions associated with the allocation of urban and rural labor, 
in particular the distortions associated with the current rapid rural-urban migration flow 
in China. Back in the 1960s, China had an old household responsibility system (HRS), 
which constrained rural residents to living in their birthplaces. But since the economic 
reform in 1978, there has been a dramatic increase in agricultural productivity, generating 
a huge labor surplus in the rural area – commonly characterized as a “push” factor driving 
the “rural-urban” labor flow. On the other hand, in urban areas, the expansion of the non-
state sector, loosening of the urban employment policy, and the economic structure 
becoming more labor-intensive, have all created demands for rural migrants (Zhao, 
2003). Williamson (1988) described this as providing labor flow for a “growing modern 
industrial complex”, usually viewed as a “pull” factor for attracting migrant peasants to 
cities (Meng and Zhang 2001; Cai 2001; Williamson 1988; Zhao 2003). Sources suggest 
that the recent estimate about the temporary migrant “floating population” is about 19% 
of the whole rural population in 2001 (Zhai et al. 2003; Fan and Qie 2002). In modern 
economic theory, increasing urbanization and labor mobility are characterized as a 
momentum of economic transformation from an agriculture-dominated economy to an 
industrialized economy, increasing labor productivity for the society as a whole, thereby 
contributing significantly to China’s rapid economic growth since its economic reform. It 
has been estimated that labor mobility and reallocation have contributed 16 to 20 percent 
to GDP growth since the initiation of the reform (World Bank 1996; Lees 1997; Cai and 
Wang 1999).  
Following the idea of the “tax-interaction effect” in the enter-exit type labor 
market described earlier, we expect there might be a similar labor market distortion 
                                                 
6 “Second-best world” is in contrast to the first best world, in which the environmental tax is the only tax in 
the economy, and an optimal first-best environmental tax is equal to marginal environmental damage (also 
called “Pigouvian tax”).  In a second-best world where environmental tax is not the only tax implemented, 




which stems from the changes in the spatial allocation of urban and rural labor forces, 
rather than from the entering or exiting behaviors in the labor market. However, more 
complicated than the distortions of labor supply in one labor market, examining the 
spatial labor market distortions with the two types of labor supply and allocations 
requires more complicated analyses. As we will discuss later, we decompose the effects 
of environmental tax into three mechanisms affecting the net migration flow from rural to 
urban areas. In terms of the general equilibrium effects, we cannot analytically determine 
the net direction of the three mechanisms. Thus we can only rely on numerical 
simulations to shed some light on the net effects of environmental taxation on the rural-
urban migration process.  
 In this report, we formulate a recursive dynamic Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model with two representative households (rural vs. urban) to 
examine the relationship between the proposed environmental tax policy and the spatial 
rural-urban migration distortions. Two environmental tax policies are selected for the 
analysis. One is fuel tax policy, a tax on primary fuels where the tax rate will be set as 
proportional to the average damage per unit of fuel use. The other one is output tax, a tax 
on sector output, where the tax rate is proportional to the marginal health damages of 
each sector. The goal of this study is to answer the following research questions: How 
would the “rural-urban” migration process be affected by the proposed environmental tax 
policy? Would the environmental tax policy exacerbate or relieve this type of labor 
market distortion? Which environmental tax policy is more efficient in terms of pollution 
reduction and impacts on the labor market?  
The report is organized as follows. Section 2 firstly discusses an extension of 
Harris and Todaro’s (1970) theoretical model on the “rural-urban” migration process and 
wage differentials. Based on this model, an empirical estimation of the determinants of 
rural peasants’ migration decisions was made using micro-level data from the Chinese 
Household Income Project (1995), thus the empirical estimations could be used to 
calibrate the key migration equation in the CGE model. Section 3 gives a brief 
description of the recursive Chinese CGE model used in this study, the calculation of 
pollution emissions and health damages, and the modeling of rural-urban migration in 
China. Section 4 presents the base case projection and describes three base case scenarios 
on future migration processes. Based on the base case projections, Section 5 presents the 
results from the counterfactual fuel tax and output tax simulations. A sensitivity analysis 
of counterfactual simulations was conducted by allowing different levels of rural-urban 
labor mobility corresponding to the three migration base scenarios. Finally, in Section 6 
the net effects of environmental tax policies on migration process are decomposed into 







2.0  CHINA’S RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND                                                  
WAGE DIFFERENTIATION 
 
In this study, the migration process is modeled explicitly in the CGE model. To 
provide crucial parameters for this migration module, it was necessary to conduct 
empirical studies before the CGE modeling exercises. First, one needs to understand the 
theoretical aspect on rural-urban migration behavior and how it is related to the rural-
urban wage differential. Then based on micro level survey data, an empirical analysis was 
conducted to estimate the key parameters in the urban-rural migration equations. 
 
2.1    Theoretical Aspects of Rural-Urban Migration and Wage Differentials 
 
  Harris and Todaro (1970) developed a rural-urban migration model where 
individuals make decisions on whether to move to urban areas or stay in rural areas, 
depending on the wage differential of the rural and urban wage levels and unemployment 
levels. If a rational migrant peasant expects a higher wage income in an urban area 
compared with a rural area (i.e., the wage rate times the employment), he would move to 
the urban area. Here, our theoretical framework for modeling is just an extension of 
Harris and Todaro’s simple model in an inter-temporal mover/stayer decision-making 
framework. Rural-urban migration decision can be derived from the optimizing behavior 
of migrant peasants, who treat the migration cost as an investment on their human capital, 
shifting from being unskilled to skilled. The more stringent the migration constraints or 
the household registration system regulations are, the higher the investment/migration 
transaction costs. The ownership of the land7 and other psychological reasons will also 
increase the migration transaction costs. Equation 1 suggests that, an individual i migrates 
when his expected discounted utility stream  in an urban area exceeds his 
expected utility stream by staying in a rural area , after subtracting the total 
present value migration cost (revised from Kinnunen 2000; and Hämäläinen and 
Böckerman 2002).  denotes the expected effective wage income when a migrant 
peasant chooses to work in the city.  





Equation (2) gives a simple calculation of , where euiW λ  indicates the 
probability of finding a job in urban areas,  is the urban wage rate for the individual i. 











ui CdteWUWU                                  (1) 
ui
e
ui WW λ=                                           (2) 
                                                 
7 Migrants’ fear of losing access to agricultural land would also prevent them from leaving the land, even 




The costs of migration  may include both direct and indirect costs of 
migration. Direct costs include transportation costs and payments to buy urban residence 
registration cards. The indirect costs include psychological costs such as being away from 
relatives in the original rural area (Zhao 1999) and other indirect migration costs due to 
the higher living costs in cities, such as higher expenditure for housing, limits to 
subsidized urban health services, children’s education costs and so forth.  
migiC ,
 
2.2 Empirical Research on Estimating Key Parameters in China’s Migration 
 Process 
Due to the old household registration (hukou) system in China, people are 
confined to their birthplaces, and a large urban-rural income gap has developed. This 
hukou system has severely hindered China’s urbanization process and created large 
“spatial”8 labor market distortions with time. Since the 1990s, due to the Chinese 
government’s relaxation on this long-standing migration control, China has begun to 
allow more labor mobility especially in recent years, and rural-urban migration has 
increased very fast and slightly mitigated the distortions in the migration process. 
However, the current income gap is still very large compared to other countries. Zhao 
(1999) documented an average annual wage gap between rural and urban work of 2,387 
Yuan for unskilled rural workers in Sichuan in 1995. The per capita income in urban 
areas is about 2.5 to 3.1 times that in rural areas (Johnson 2002; NBSRG 1994). Sicular 
and Zhao (2002) empirically tested the effects of trade liberalization on levels of 
employment and earnings and estimated the household labor supply function. However, 
they did not model the rural and urban migration decisions specifically, thus it is difficult 
to incorporate their results directly in the CGE modeling used in this study. In the 
following section, a switching regression method is explicitly employed to estimate the 
determinants of rural peasants’ migration decisions. 
 
2.2.1 Data 
In our empirical analysis, we use the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP 
19959) data set from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
The CHIP 1995 data set was collected by Carl Riskin, Zhao Renwei and Li Shi (2000); it 
was a joint research effort sponsored by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, the Asian Development Bank, and the Ford Foundation, with additional 
support provided by the East Asian Institute, Columbia University. This survey was 
selected from significantly larger samples (approximately 65,000 rural households and 
35,000 urban households) drawn by the State Statistical Bureau. 
The CHIP 1995 household survey data set is useful because it provides relevant 
information on rural peasants’ migration behavior, personal income and hours worked in 
                                                 
8 Here, “spatial” labor market distortions do not refer to real spatial migration from one region to another 
region, but the shifting between “rural” and “urban” categories only. 
9 In this study, we used the CHIP 1995 dataset. Although a later CHIP survey has been conducted, the 
dataset has not yet been made available to the public. The empirical work will be updated in a later version 
of this study, when more current data is available. 
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different occupations as well as a wide range of individual and household characteristics 
in both rural and urban areas of China.10 In addition to the responses of migrants, we also 
learnt their work distribution in urban manufacturing sectors. For our estimations, we 
dropped individuals who did not answer the migration question on whether he/she would 
leave the household to work in other areas, so our sub-sample covered 7,500 households 
containing 21,127 working-age adults.11  
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the migrant and non-migrant workers 
for both male and female. This summary data foreshadows, to some extent, our 
estimation of the urban-rural migration decision-making. We find migrants’ wage income 
is much higher than non-migrants. For male labor, the individual income is about four 
times of non-migrants; and for female labor, the migrants’ income is about 12 times that 
of non-migrants. On average, the average income of migrant male labor is only 20% 
higher than that of female migrant labor, while the average income of non-migrant male 
labor is more than two times higher than that of female non-migrant labor.  
Table 1 also suggests that migrants are younger than non-migrants for both male 
and female labor. In addition, migrants are better educated than non-migrants, and male 
workers have higher education levels than female workers. Among the male workers, the 
average duration of schooling is 7.35 years for migrant labor, with only 6.72 years for 
non-migrant labor. For female labor, the average education duration for migrant female 
labor is 6.82 years, about 1.8 years more than that of non-migrant female labor.   In 
addition, single people tend to migrate, while married people are less likely to migrate.  
Except for individual characteristics, household characteristics are also very 
important in explaining why peasants move. From Table 1, we find households with more 
land tend to stay in the rural area. If the migrant has a large household size, or he/she has 
more brothers or sisters, or he/she is the eldest, he/she is more likely to migrate to urban 
areas.  
 
                                                 
10 Currently ICPSR data is available for two years, 1988 and 1995. In the 1995 data, it provides information 
on people’s migration information, but in the 1988 data set, there is no migration information. So our study 
only relies on the 1995 cross-sectional data. 
11 We define working-age adults as individuals who are older than 15 years. 
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Table 1. Individual and household characteristics of migrants and non-migrants 
Variable Male Female 





Wage (yuan per year) 2,879 680 2,357 186 
Age (years) 28.29 37.89 22.56 36.23 
Years of Schooling 7.35 6.72 6.84 5.05 
Dummy: Education Level      
    Illiterate or semi-literate 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.20 
    Primary/elementary school 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.41 
    Junior middle school 0.57 0.47 0.57 0.33 
    Senior middle school and above 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.06 
Dummy: Marriage Status (if married)    0.51 0.77 0.21 0.79 
Total land size controlled by the household 
(mu) 7.34 7.98 7.71 8.07 
Household Size  4.92 4.55 5.35 4.66 
Number of Brothers and Sisters 1.49 0.63 2.23 0.58 
Dummy: Eldest Status (if the eldest in the 
family)  0.37 0.19 0.42 0.11 
Region Dummy Variable     
     Beijing  0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 
     Hebei  0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 
     Shanxi  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
     Liaoning  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 
     Jilin  0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 
     Jiangsu  0.10 0.05 0.08 0.05 
     Anhui  0.09 0.04 0.14 0.04 
     Jiangxi  0.06 0.09 0.07 0.09 
     Shandong  0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 
     Henna  0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 
     Hubei  0.09 0.05 0.12 0.05 
     Hunan  0.14 0.09 0.14 0.10 
     Sichuan  0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 
     Guizhou  0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 
     Yunnan  0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 
     Shannxi  0.03 0.05 0.00 0.05 
     Gansu  0.12 0.06 0.17 0.06 
     Guangdong 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 
 Number of Observations  1,032 9,853 436 9,806 
Notes: This table summarizes the mean statistics of the survey data.  
a  Dummy: Dummy Variable is a numerical variable used in regression analysis to represent sub-groups of 
the sample. For example, dummy variable on marriage status = 1 if married, = 0 if not married.  
b 1mu = 0.0667 hectares = 1/6 acre 
 
2.2.2 Determinants of Rural Peasants’ Migration Decision 
Based on Harris and Todaro’s extension model described earlier, urban-rural 
wage differential is an important factor in rural peasants’ migration decision. In the CHIP 
1995 data set, as in many labor economics studies, the problem of sample selection may 
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arise, since the migrants’ wage income is considered only if they had already migrated. 
So we apply the switching regression methodology introduced by Van der Gaag and 
Vijverberg (1988) and Zhu (2002) to address these kinds of econometric issues, and then 
analyze the impact of the income differential on migration decisions. We assume the 
migration selection process has two steps: first, an individual peasant will determine 
whether or not to migrate to obtain an urban job. Second, he/she may or may not obtain 
one in the urban area. He/she will compare the likelihood of the migration costs and risks 
of not having an urban job with the expected benefits. The probability of obtaining an 
urban job depends on individual characteristics, such as the migrant peasant’s age, 
education level, geographic location, etc. Then the selection decision will be: an 
individual peasant will migrate if and only if:  
1)ln(ln εγ +>− Zww ru                                              (3) 
where 
   = the wage rate of migrant labor  uw
   = the wage rate of non-migrant labor  rw
   Z = a vector of factors associated with the peasants’ migration decision making  
   1ε = disturbance term 
Similar to Van der Gaag and Vijverberg’s (1988) approach to the selection 
process for public and private sector jobs, the above equation summarizes the two-step 
process: first, the expected urban-rural wage differential must be large enough so that 
peasants would like to migrate. Second, migrants have to face the selection process by the 
urban employers. Therefore, even if they migrate, they may still not be accepted by urban 
employers. 
We assume that migrant wages and non-migrant wages are determined as follows: 
1ln uXw uu += β                                   (4) 
2ln uXw rr += β                                              (5) 
where X is a vector of wage determining variables. 
We now substitute equations (4) and (5) into equation (3) to get the selection rule 
(Equation 6): 
1I =  if 0''')( 121 >++=−−+−− εγβεγββ ZXuuZXru  (i.e. peasant will 
migrate to an urban area)  
0I =  otherwise                                                                          (6) 
where I represents the migration decision, 'β , 'γ  and  are coefficients in the reduced 
form equation. Assume the normality of all the disturbance terms , and , we can 
obtain the maximum likelihood of 
'e
1e 1u 2u
uβ and rβ . Note that ordinary least square (OLS) 
regressions on the migrant and non-migrant peasants are biased for OLS assumes 
that 0),cov( 11 =εu  and 0),cov( 12 =εu .  
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To solve this sample selection bias issue, we follow the three-step approach 
applied in Zhu (2002). Firstly, we estimate a reduced form probit function.   
''' εγβ ++= ZXI                                             (7) 
where X is a vector of independent variables in the income equations and Z is a vector of 
independent variables in the selection equations. The result of the reduce form regression 
is presented in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Determinants of the migration decision (reduced probit equation) 
 Reduced Form Equation 
  Male Female 
Age (years)  0.050*** (0.016) 0.020 (0.034) 
Age square -0.101*** (0.023) -0.074 (0.053) 
Education (years)  0.035 (0.024) 0.032 (0.032) 
Education square  -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 
Average household expenditure 
(yuan per year) -0.00004*** (0.00001) -0.00006*** (0.00001) 
Land size (mu) -0.011*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 
Dummy: Marriage Status (if married) -0.208*** (0.067) -0.762*** (0.116) 
Household Size 0.089*** (0.017) 0.125*** (0.024) 
Number of Brothers and Sisters 0.072*** (0.025) -0.011 (0.030) 
Dummy: Eldest Status (if the eldest  
in the family)  0.029 (0.046) 0.215*** (0.068) 
Constant -1.672*** (0.299) -1.216*** (0.520) 
Province fixed effects F stats 212.960 200.970 
 (P<0.0001) (P<0.0001) 
log-likelihood -2,943 -1,272  
Number of Observations  10,885  10,242  
Notes: 
1) Dependent Variable: I = 1 if migrate, I = 0 if not migrate  
2) The t-statistics are presented in parentheses: 
*   indicates coefficient significance at 10% level 
**  indicates coefficient significance at 5% level  
*** indicates coefficient significance at 1% level 
 
 Second, we estimate migrant’s income function and non-migrant’s income 
function following the Heckman two-stage procedure to correct the sample selection bias 
(Heckman 1979). From the above reduced probit function, we can calculate the inverse 
mill ratio. Finally, we include the inverse mill ratio in the income generation functions as 
follows: 
        1ln uXw uuuu ++= ληβ                      (8) 
        2ln uXw rrrr ++= ληβ                        (9) 
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where uλ  and rλ  are inverse mill ratio calculated using  from the 
reduced probit function (7). Table 3 shows the estimation of income equation (8) and (9) 
after sample selection adjustment for both male and female labor.  
)ˆ(/)ˆ( bXbXu Φ= φλ
 
Table 3. Income equation after adjustment of sample selection bias 
 Male Female 
  Migrant Non-migrant Migrant Non-migrant 




































Average household  
expenditure 

























R-square 0.142 0.126 0.170 0.117 
Number of  
observations 908 3388 383 1099 
Notes: 
The t-stats are presented in parentheses: 
*    indicates coefficient significance at 10% level 
**  indicates coefficient significance at 5% level  
*** indicates coefficient significance at 1% level 
 
We find that income and age present an inverted U relationship, since age reflects 
the accumulation of human capital and social capital, for example, the accumulation of 
working experience and building up human connections, the so-called “guanxi” network 
in China. The age effect is much higher for migrants than non-migrants for both male and 
female workers. In addition, except for female migrants, income increases with education 
level, but the coefficients of education square are negative, so the marginal return on 
education is diminishing. But overall, the education effects are not statistically 
significant. Finally, we use county level average household expenditure as the proxy for 
the development level of the local area, thus we also have control for within-province 
difference. Finally we also have control for province fixed effects. From our regression, 
we find that if the local county average household expenditure is higher, the wage rates 
tend to be higher too. 
Finally, we can recover the structural probit equation as Zhu (2002) did. From 
equation (8) and (9), we predict the migrant’s urban wage , and non-migrant’s rural uŵln
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wage . Then we can estimate the structural probit model, which includes the urban-




* ')ˆlnˆ(ln εγϕ ++−= ZwwI ru             (10) 
Table 4 shows the estimates of the impacts of urban-rural wage differential on 
migration decisions. Our results show that male and female workers have similar 
migration-wage elasticity, though it is slightly smaller for females. This result is quite 
different from Zhu (2002), who found that the migration-wage elasticity is about 1.38 for 
male workers and only 0.6 for female workers. Zhu (2002) applied similar switching 
functions to estimate the elasticities, but he used a small sample from only one province, 
Hubei province, in 1993. In contrast, our sample covers 17 provinces and the data was 
collected more recently in 1995. Zhu found the migration to be strongly selective, 
depending on the sex status. But we do not find evidence to support this argument. In 
addition, Zhu used per capita GDP as a proxy for regional development level. However, 
we believe using the per capita GDP data for a county level study is not appropriate, since 
the GDP data is usually collected at province level, so it is too aggregated to be treated as 
a proxy for local income. Therefore, we choose the county level average household 
expenditure to indicate within province variations on the wage determination. 
 
Table 4. Determinants of migration decision (structure probit equation) 
 Structure Form Equation 
 Male Female 
ru ww ˆlnˆln −  0.749*** (0.161) 0.717*** (0.187) 
Age (year) 0.022 (0.017) -0.067** (0.041) 
Age square -0.058** (0.024) 0.056 (0.063) 
Education (years) 0.055** (0.024) 0.113*** (0.037) 
Education square -0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) 
Land size (mu) -0.012*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 
Dummy: Marriage Status (if 
married)  -0.232*** (0.064) -0.759*** (0.116) 
Household Size 0.099*** (0.017) 0.124*** (0.024) 
Number of Brothers and Sisters 0.080*** (0.025) -0.011 (0.030) 
Dummy: Eldest Status (if the 
eldest in the family) 0.032 (0.046) 0.214*** (0.068) 
Constant -2.585*** (0.309) 1.641*** (0.501) 
Region Dummy fixed effects (F 
statistics) 127.42 73.87 
 (p<0.001) (p<0.001) 
log-likelihood -2943 -1271 
Number of Observations 10,885 10,242 
Notes: 
1) Dependent Variable: I = 1 if migrate, I = 0 if not migrate 
2) The t-stats are presented in parentheses: 
* indicates coefficient significance at 10% level 
** indicates coefficient significance at 5% level  




       Since the elasticities for both male and female workers are positive, our results 
confirmed the Harris-Todaro theory through our empirical study. That is, if the urban-
rural income differential increases, peasants are more likely to move. In addition, older 
male workers tend to be more likely to migrate to cities, probably driven by the 
responsibility and financial burden in raising a family. On the other hand, young women 
are more likely than older women to move. It might be the reason that the young women 
hope to save enough money from their urban jobs before they get married and settle 
down. Education level has a statistically significant positive effect on migration, since 
higher education increases the likelihood of getting an urban job in the labor market. 
Therefore, the expected returns from the migration would be higher than the expected 
migration costs. In particular the job searching costs will be less for higher educated 
workers. But the coefficients for the quadratic term are negative for both male and female 
workers; this might suggest that the marginal effects of the education level on migration 
are decreasing. Marriage status is also an important factor. Single people tend to move, 
while married people are more stable, preferring to stay at home due to family 
commitments such as the marital relationship, taking care of children and/or elderly 
parents and so on. 
 
Furthermore, other household characteristics are important in the individual 
migration decision too. For example, the lack of land seems to be a driving force 
stimulating peasants to migrate to urban areas for jobs, while people who own land tend 
to stay for fear of losing it. In addition, if the household size is large, if the peasant has 
brother or sisters, or if he/she is the eldest child, the peasant is more likely to migrate. 
 
 
3.0  THE CGE MODEL 
 
A recursive Solow CGE model is applied to explore the inter-relationship between 
environmental tax reform and the rural-urban migration process. This model has been 
developed from the prototype Solow China model by Garbaccio, Ho and Jorgenson 
(2000), Ho and Jorgenson (2007). In this paper we updated the Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) table to the year 2000. In addition, we extended the one representative household 
assumption to two representative households (urban and rural) assumption. The summary 
of the structure of the CGE model is shown in Figure 1.  
 
3.1   Overview of the Recursive Chinese CGE Economic Model 
Our CGE model is calibrated to the 2000 SAM table, which was collected by Li 
Shantong and He Jianwu of the State Development Research Center in Beijing. Our 
model includes 33 industries, five production factors and two representative households 
(urban and rural). Among the factors, capital, labor, energy aggregate and non-energy 
aggregate are used by all the 33 sectors, while land is used only by agriculture, crude 
petroleum mining, and natural gas mining sector. Our urban manufacturing sectors 
include 5 mining sectors, 19 manufacturing sectors, 1 utility sector and 7 service sectors. 
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The summary of the characteristics of the 33 sectors and their pollutant emissions are 
shown in Table 5.  
 
Figure 1. The Structure of the CGE Model of China  
The setup of the USE and MAKE tables is the same as the US model in Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen (1993) and recursive China Model in Garbaccio, Ho and Jorgenson (2000). 
The USE table represents the intermediate requirements for production. The inputs of 
industry j are represented in the jth column of the USE table. Moreover, each domestic 
commodity group may consist of products from several industries, and this is represented 
by the MAKE table. The make-up of commodity i is represented by column i of the 
MAKE table. In our 2000 data, the MAKE table is fairly diagonal, thus most of the 
commodities are produced by the single industry, i.e., the only element of the column is 
the Mii element. The flow of payments among various agents in the economy is 
summarized in the macro social accounting matrix (SAM) given in Table 6. Each row of 
the SAM represents the incoming receipts of industry, factor or institution. The 
 14
  
corresponding column represents the expenditure or outflow of the sector, factor or 
institution. The sum of the row elements should be equal to the sum of the column 
elements, so that all SAM payments are balanced, and the incoming value and outgoing 
values for all sectors, factors, and institutions should be equal. 
Structurally, the economic model is composed of production, household income 
distribution, consumption, investment, government revenue and saving, international 
trade, market equilibrium, and macro closure. Our model adopts a simple Solow growth 
model formulation to project future economic growth, which is driven by an exogenous 
savings rate .  From the 2000 input-output table, we calibrate the saving rate for the 
base year 2000 at about 25%. During our simulation years 2000-2030, we recognize the 
phenomenon that Chinese people are over-saving due to a variety of reasons such as lack 
of good social security, insurance and so forth. Therefore, we assume that the saving rate 
will steadily decline towards the end of our simulation year 2030, when we assume the 
saving rate at about 20%. To model the household demand on commodities, we use a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function form because we currently lack the micro-level household 
expenditure survey data to estimate for a translog function form of the demand function.   
st
On the production side, we also assume Cobb-Douglas production functions. Like 
Garbaccio, Ho and Jorgenson (2000), we model a two-tier pricing system which allows 
for the fact that China is undergoing a gradual shift from a planned economy to a market 
economy. A fixed quota of output in each industry is sold at plan prices while output in 
excess of this quota is sold at market prices. Therefore, both planned and market 
allocation exist; this only creates a redistribution of profit between sectors, thus fixed 
output quotas are not binding, only infra-marginal. By modeling this two-tier pricing 
system, marginal decisions are based on market prices only rather than plan prices. The 
plan prices are exogenously modeled and are therefore just fixed parameters, changing 
over time according to our forecast of future market reforms. We do not model for 
optimal planned allocation, and plan prices are excluded from first-order conditions. 
In our model, for simplicity, sectors are differentiated between rural and urban 
labor using a simple transformation function from unskilled to skilled labor, and we 
assume imperfect substitution between them. Urban labor is assumed not employed in 
agriculture, but perfectly mobile across non-agriculture sectors. Rural labor is assumed 
perfectly mobile across sectors, with about 82 percent employed in the agriculture sector. 
In our model, capital is assumed to be not perfectly mobile. It includes both fixed and 
mobile components. 
Technology is characterized with constant returns to scale and labor augmenting. 
We assume that the production structure of China will resemble that of US in the future. 
As described in Garbaccio, Ho and Jorgenson (2000), the inter-temporal capital, labor, 
energy, land and material shares are assumed to gradually converge to the US input-
output shares of year 1982 in about 50 years.  The shares of coal, oil and gas in total 
energy costs are also expected to change with time, and roughly converge to the US 
energy share as well, except for an adjustment on the assumption that coal will still be the 
predominant energy source for the next 50 years. We also make exogenous time series 
projections on future population growth and the structure of age groups, public and 
current account deficits, world commodity prices, plan quantities and prices, plan capital, 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) index of technology and so forth. 
 15
  














     TSP SO2 
1 Agriculture 2,645 1,194 40.3 136.9 297.1 
2 Coal mining and processing 202 86 30.1 171.3 176.3 
3 Crude petroleum mining 412 823 32.0 76.8 90.5 
4 Natural Gas Mining 26 39 2.9 3.0 4.0 
5 Metal ore mining 98 59 9.9 29.6 31.3 
6 Non-ferrous mineral mining 140 111 15.6 26.6 28.8 
7 Food products, tobacco 1,465 880 31.3 274.3 410.4 
8 Textile goods 1,110 730 23.5 121.6 257.1 
9 Apparel, leather 599 459 4.0 9.1 12.9 
10 Sawmills and furniture 150 42 6.4 65.8 91.6 
11 Paper products, printing  491 175 24.2 184.0 251.5 
12 Petroleum refining & coking 794 369 334.0 211.7 307.7 
13 Chemical 2,159 1,109 222.7 684.8 1,099.0 
14 Nonmetal mineral products 628 523 119.7 10,665.7 2,338.5 
15 Metals smelting & pressing 1,153 694 361.6 1,476.3 1,470.4 
16 Metal products 420 250 23.4 123.3 73.1 
17 Machinery and equipment 903 406 43.6 78.4 119.9 
18 Transport equipment 1,016 502 22.1 36.4 52.2 
19 Electrical machinery 987 478 15.0 21.2 28.3 
20 Electronic & telecom. Equip 1,161 821 7.2 12.4 11.5 
21 Instruments 97 56 1.4 2.3 3.1 
22 Other manufacturing  182 307 7.8 139.9 182.8 
23 Electricity, steam, hot water 852 2,119 468.6 3,037.7 7,199.6 
24 Gas production and supply 38 16 37.1 90.2 70.5 
25 Construction 2,216 643 77.4 204.3 628.9 
26 Transport & warehousing 678 1,522 53.9 333.5 563.3 
27 Post & telecommunication 380 1,324 10.1 0.1 5.6 
28 Commerce & Restaurants 1,918 907 30.6 110.4 243.5 
29 Finance and insurance 517 401 2.6 11.1 21.0 
30 Real estate 296 1,989 7.4 78.1 134.2 
31 Social services 808 1,236 31.8 207.6 405.6 
32 Health, Educ., other services 883 1,228 39.0 359.6 615.4 
33 Public administration 559 654 15.8 98.7 183.4 
 Totals 25,979 22,152 2,239.9 19,082.4 17,408.
9 
Source: State Statistical Bureau Social Accounting Matrix for 2000; China Statistical Yearbook 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003; China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2000-2003; and author’s estimate. 





Table 6. Summary of Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for China, 2000 (billion yuan) 
         Govt   Extra VAT    






. Govt VAT System Rebate Assets Row Total 
Commodity  17097.4    2369.9 1919.7   945.9  224.6 105.0 3250.0 2338.4 28250.8 
Industry 26153.6 0.0              26153.6 
Labor  4659.7              4659.7 
Capital  2199.5              2199.5 
Land  621.8              621.8 
Urban HH   2851.9 0.0 0.0   300.9  234.0     48.1 3435.0 
Rural HH   1803.9 0.0 529.0   23.0  17.9     3.7 2377.4 
Enterprises    2082.1 92.9           2174.9 




 510.9    41.5 16.2 253.0   642.2   259.7 8.8 1732.2 
VAT/Bus 
tax  642.2              642.2 
Extra 
System  525.8              525.8 
VAT 
Rebate          105.0      105.0 
Assets      1023.6 441.5 1598.0  319.7  301.2   -174.4 3509.7 
Row 2097.2  3.953 117.5      5.9      2224.5 
Total 28250.8 26153.6 4659.7 2199.5 621.8 3435.0 2377.4 2174.9 0.0 1732.2 642.2 525.8 105.0 3509.7 2224.5  
 




For trade modeling, we take the usual Armington assumption. Domestic product is 
combined with imports to produce a composite good using a CES function. Exports are 
price sensitive, and determined by the exogenous current account balance and world price 
of commodities. Temporal accounting is observed. Investments accumulate into capital. 
Government deficits accumulate into a stock of public debt, and current account deficits 
accumulate into a stock of foreign debt. The public deficit is set exogenously and tax rates 
are calibrated from the 2000 input-output table. The current account balance and foreign 
debts are assumed exogenous in the model, merely to maintain accounting consistency, 
which play no role in the simulations. The government expenditures and tax revenues are 
endogenous, and determined by the size of economic activities. Although our single 
country model has strong assumptions on exogenous variables that would affect our base 
case simulation, the measured difference between the counterfactual and base case should 
be influenced only marginally. 
 
3.2   Modeling Pollution Emissions and Health Damages 
Environmental data is constructed to be consistent with the sector division 
framework, and total emission and energy use data are based on the China Environmental 
Yearbook, China Statistical Yearbook, China Energy Yearbook and China Energy 
Databook v5.0 and v6.0 (David et al. 2001; Sinton et al. 2004). In our model, we consider 
three kinds of pollution emissions: particulate matters (PM10), Sulphur Dioxide (SO2), and 
Nitrogen Oxide (NOx). In addition to the primary pollutants, we also include the 
secondary pollutants such as sulfates and nitrates. We assume the pollution emissions 
( ) of pollutant x in sector j at period t are produced from the fuel combustion 




jftjxft AF )(ψ jtjxtQIσ ).  
                                     ∑+=
f
jftjxftjtjxtjxt AFQIEM )(ψσ                                                  (11) 
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tjxft kk ψψψ )1( −+=                                                           (13) 
where  
x = PM10, SO2, NOX,  
f = coal, oil, gas, and 
j = sectors (1, …, 33, households) 
Estimates of the base year combustion emission factor ( jxftψ ) and non-combustion 
emission factor ( jxtσ ) are calibrated from the China emission data in the energy databook 
v 6.0 and the current 2000 SAM table. The time series emission factors are allowed to 
change throughout time, for simplicity we model the future emission factors as the 
weighted average of the current technology (denoted as O) and future new technologies 
(denoted as N), as given in equations (12) and (13). Thus future emission factors will 
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gradually decline due to higher investment and more application of low-emission 
technologies. 
Following the intake fraction method introduced in Ho and Jorgenson (2007), we 
take the intake fraction parameters estimated by the China Project, Harvard University 
Center for the Environment. The researchers in the China Project applied different scale 
air dispersion models to calculate the concentration change due to emissions from a large 
sample of smoke stacks in five cities in China. The industrial intake fraction studies had 
been conducted in China’s most polluting industries – iron and steel, cement, chemicals, 
electricity and transportation. By repeatedly running air dispersion models many times, 
the intake fraction parameters were estimated by calculating the concentration change due 
to various height smoke stacks, geographic conditions, wind directions and speeds, local 
population distribution, breathing rate, real emission data collected, etc. Then the local 
sample intake fraction estimates by each industry were scaled to the whole country using 
simple adjustments recommended by Wang et al. (2007) and Ho and Jorgenson (2007).12   
Furthermore, Ho and Jorgenson (2007) take the average of their five sectors and applied 
this to the rest of the manufacturing sectors.  
According to Ho and Jorgenson (2007), the intake fraction parameter (iF) is 
interpreted as “the fraction of emissions from a particular source that is actually inhaled 
by someone within the domain analyzed”, which is given by:  








=         (14) 
where BR  is the breathing rate, is the change in concentration at location d due to the 
emission of pollutant x in sector j - , is the population exposed to the pollution 
at location d.  
xdC
xjEM dPOP
Emissions are calculated in our model simulation when we reach economic 
equilibrium, then using the estimated iF parameters, we can define the total dosage as the 
product of the iF parameters and the total simulated emissions ( ) from sector j at 
period t (15). Note in our simulation, since our data is updated using the projected 
population and composition, we also update our intake fractions every year. With the 
updated dosage estimation in each sector j, we can derive the health damages. Note in the 
traditional health damage estimation, health effects are calculated as the product of dose 
response parameters, concentration changes, and population exposed to the environmental 











, so the product of 
BR
DOSExj  and the dose-response 
parameters will give us the estimated health damages  (16). The final step is to hxDR
S
hjHE
                                                 
12 In Wang et al. (2007), it is estimated that iF(infinity) exceeds iF(50km) by a factor of two or three. 
Following Ho and Jorgenson (2007), a simple adjustment is taken by multiplying the manufacturing 
industry iFs by a factor of three.  
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calculate the monetary value of the health damage , which is given by equation (17), 
where  is the value of willingness to pay for each type health effect endpoint at period t.    
tTD
htV
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3.3   Modeling Rural-Urban Migration 
In the numerical simulation literature, some models have explicitly included the 
migration component in the model. For example, Hoffman et al. (1996) modeled the 
interstate factor mobility in a regional model. Based on the Harris-Todaro model, Zhai 
and Wang (2002) applied a linear transformation equation to analyze the changes in rural-
urban migration due to China’s WTO entry. Kinnunen (2000) used the probability of 
population staying corresponding to the overall population levels to approximate the 
different levels of unemployment rates spatially.  
From Harris and Todaro’s migration theory and our empirical work on the wage 
differential between rural and urban labor, as well as the migration decision-making 
function, we can assume there is a periodic random job selection process from the 
combined pool of urban resident labor supply and rural migrants.  For the migrant 
peasants, let us assume peasants have perfect knowledge on their expected wage rate , 
as described in equation (18).  
e
utW


















ut ϕ              (18) 
 From the CHIP survey data, we have the information of how many people move to 
the urban area; and their distribution over the 33 industries if they got the job. jϕ  is the 
distribution share of the number of the migrants working in the sector j, of the total 
number of migrants. For example, the CHIP 1995 survey shows that about 29% peasants 
working in the construction sector, 12% in trade and restaurants, about 37% in 
manufacturing sectors, and 4% in transportation and communication. Using these 
estimated share parameters, we define the base case parameter as  for each sector 
j, which are directly extracted from our surveys.   
0
jj ϕϕ =
 However, in the counterfactual tax simulation cases, jϕ needs to be adjusted to 
allow for general equilibrium effects of environmental taxes. For example, some sectors 
might shrink due to the negative impacts from environmental taxes while other cleaner 
sectors might expand. Due to the general equilibrium effects and size changes of each 
sector, the labor demand of each sector will change, and the distribution of migrant 
workers will be affected, in particular in the manufacturing sectors. Therefore in our 
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counterfactual case, we make a simple adjustment to calculate the average migrants’ wage 
rate as follows:  


































ϕ         (19) 
  
where  is the urban labor demand of sector j in the counterfactual case, is the 
urban labor demand of sector j in the base case, and  is urban wage rate of sector j in 
the counterfactual simulations. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, if the 
size of the industry increases, the number of migrants hired in that sector will also 







 In our recursive model, we recognize that wages are different among all the 
sectors, thus labor is not homogeneous and the productivity per worker, i.e., the 
equilibrium wage rate will vary from industry to industry. However, due to the optimal 
allocation of labor inputs across all industries, the marginal revenue product of labor per 
effective labor unit, i.e., the effective wage rate, should be the same under the assumption 
of perfect substitution. Considering that labor is heterogeneous across industries, we 
introduce a labor quality index LDjψ which converts effective labor wage per labor unit to 
the real wage rate per worker. In our production function, we use equalized wage rate per 
effective labor units, thus the effective wage rate is the same across all industries, but the 
wage rates per worker vary depending on their labor productivity in that sector. The 
relationship between the real wage rate per worker and the effective labor wage rate 
per effective labor unit W  is as follows.
jW
13 
                          (20) WW LDjj ⋅=ψ
 In our model, rural wage is modeled as the average wage rate in the rural area. 
Due to data limitation, we only have the value of labor inputs in each sector in the rural 
area, but we do not have quantity of labor inputs, thus we assume that in making 
migration decisions, peasants only compare their expected wage rate if they migrate with 
the average rural average wage rate, without further differentiating the rural wages by 
sector.  
 To simulate the migration process, a simple CET function is widely used to 
specify a “transformation” of rural labor into urban migrant labor (Eq. 21), i.e., from 
unskilled labor to skilled labor. Previous studies, such as Roland-Holst (1997) and Zhai et 
al. (2003) also use CET functions to model the relationship between migration and wage 
gap. 
 
                                                 
13 Here the equation holds for both rural and urban labor. 
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=                       (21) 
where  is the number of migrant workers, and  is the number of rural workers 
working in the agricultural sector.  
mL RL
 In our CGE model, for calibration purposes we revise the function form in 
equation (21), so that we can incorporate our empirical work to calibrate the key 
coefficients directly (Eq. 22).  













==                                (22) 
where Z'γα =  in equation (10) and function F is a cumulative normal distribution 
function. Based on the law of large numbers, the probability of rural workers migrating 






. In Table 4, we provided the estimation results of our structure 
probit equation on the determinants of migration decisions. Here, we use a constant 
parameter α  to represent all the non-wage related factors (vector Z ) such as age, 
education, marriage status, etc. Note that although these control variables are important, 
our variable of interest is ϕ . In our previous empirical work, we provided the estimation 
results on ϕ  for both male and female workers. Since the SAM table used in this study 
only provides the aggregate data without sex classification, we use equation (23) to 
calculate the aggregate coefficient $ϕ .  
734.0%717.0%749.0%ˆ%ˆˆ ≈⋅+⋅=⋅+⋅= FemaleMaleFemaleMale femalemale ϕϕϕ       (23) 
From the migration data in 2000, we find that about 27 million rural peasants 
migrated to the urban area, and the total agricultural labor is about 360 million. Thus, 
using this base year probability and calibrated parameterϕ̂ , we can easily deriveα̂ . Using 
the calibrated parameters ϕ̂  andα̂ , we can bring equation (22) into the CGE model, thus 
we can measure the migration flow based on the urban migrants’ and rural wage ratio. 
After we impose the environmental tax, the economy-wide effects will cause the 
variations in the urban vs. rural migrant wage gap, and eventually affect the equilibrium 
migration (Eq. 22).   
Although there might be some crowding effects for the urban household, the 
current data shows that rural peasants actually enter informal sectors such as construction 
and service sectors or work as blue collar workers in industrial sectors, while the majority 
of urban households usually work in formal sectors or at different levels and are not easily 
replaced by the peasant workers. Therefore, we assume that crowding effects are very 
small and that the labor supply of urban households simply equals their labor 
endowments: 
utut LLS =                 (24) 
The migration labor can be calculated as follows. 
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rtrtmt LLSL −=           (25) 






t TAXNtransferRtransferGIGDIVIDCDCHWYD −+++++−= ___)(  
(26)                                                  
where  is the working hours of migrant labor, and the migrants’ disposable income is 
calculated as the wage income and other incomes from the dividend income , 
government interest payments on public debt to households , government 
transfers , rest of the world transfers , deducted by the migration 









4.0  BASE CASE PROJECTIONS AND SCENARIO DESIGNS 
 
4.1   Base Case Projections 
 
The base case is defined as a “business as usual” scenario, that is, without any 
environmental tax policy taking place. Our goal is to provide estimates of the changes in 
the urban-rural migration process, environmental damages, and economic performance 
due to the implementation of an environmental tax policy. Therefore, we need a projection 
of the future Chinese economy and future trend of rural-urban migration flow as the base 
case scenario. Our projections involve many simple assumptions, such as future 
population growth14, technical progress and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth, 
changes in the household preferences, changes in the world economy and so forth. 
Although we made these exogenous assumptions, our central goal is to compare the base 
case and counterfactual cases. Therefore, we only have second-order effects on the 
percentage changes on the simulation variables of interests. 
Since our data is based on the year 2000, we set it as our benchmark year for our 
base case simulation. The goal is to calibrate the first year of our model so that it can 
replicate the Chinese economy in the benchmark year. That is, all the key variables such 
as the labor force, capital stock, consumption, investment, import, export, and government 
expenditure, all match the real data in the input-output table of year 2000. After that, 
using the recursive structure of the Solow growth model, we run the CGE model 
repeatedly to simulate the Chinese economy in subsequent years. For each year, our 
model projects the output of all 33 sectors, the purchases of all intermediate inputs and 
factors, the consumption by urban and rural households, investment, government 
expenditure, exports, imports, and so forth. In this CGE model, the saving rate is set 
exogenously from 25% in the base year and then gradually declines to 20% in 2020. Thus 
household saving is exogenously determined and becomes the investment for the next 
period. Furthermore, in the subsequent period, capital stock will be updated from previous 
period investments, the labor force figure will be also updated from our projected future 
                                                 
14 Projection Data Source: World Bank CHN data, http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats 
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population, and the model will solve for all the equations again. In our model simulations, 
we repeat such a recursive process to model the future 30 years of Chinese economic 
growth.  
Table 7 presents the simulation results of the main variables for the base case in 
the years 2000, 2010 and 2030. In our base case, GDP grows at an average rate of about 
5.0% for the next 30 years. GDP growth is determined by the exogenous saving rate, 
overall TFP growth and so forth. We assume the growth rate will gradually decline over 
the next 30 years. By simulating the economy dynamically, our projection of the average 
GDP growth rate for the first 10 years is about 7.3% and 6.0% for the first 20 years. The 
projected GDP growth rate in this model is similar to other model forecasts, such as the 
6.7% projected by the World Bank (1997) and 7.5% growth rate (2000-2010) by the 
Second Generation Model (SGM) used in Jiang and Hu (2001). The total population 
growth is projected at a slow 0.5% annual rate. However, due to the rapid urbanization 
and rural-urban migration process, the urban population rises very quickly at the annual 
rate of 1.33%. The rural population stays almost the same as the base year 2000, and in 
some years, there is even a very small negative growth.  
 
Table 7. Selected variables from base case simulation 
     30-year 
Variable 2000 2010 2030  growth rate 
      
Urban Population (million) 457 593 679  1.33% 
Rural Population (million) 805 758 801  -0.02% 
GDP (billion 2000 yuan) 9,128 18,430 39,180  5.00% 
Energy Use (fossil fuels, million tons of 
standard coal equivalent) 
1,213 2,075 3,115  3.19% 
Coal Use (million tons) 1,232 2,066 2,992  3.00% 
Oil Use (million tons) 209 375 602  3.59% 
Carbon Emissions (million tons) 808 1,376 2,047  3.15% 
Primary Particulate Emissions (m tons) 11.43 8.76 9.10  -0.01% 
SO2 Emissions (million tons) 19.26 26.24 35.54  2.06% 
Nox (transportation) (million tons) 3.07 6.23 11.21  4.41% 
Premature Deaths (1,000) 91 142 247  3.35% 
Value of Health Damages (mil. yuan) 156 282 426  3.41% 
Health Damage/GDP 1.71% 2.50% 3.50%   





In the base case, energy use is assumed to grow slower than the GDP growth, so 
that the energy-GDP ratio will decline over time.  Among various energy uses, we assume 
oil use will grow slightly faster than coal use, about 3.59% in our simulations. The growth 
rates of coal use and carbon emissions are similar, ranging from 3.0% to 3.2%. As for 
particulate matters, we assume China will make substantial improvement in end pipe 
technologies to abate primary particulate matter emissions. So in our model, our assumed 
emission coefficients for new and old capital investment and future projections of coal 
share will decrease, while oil share will increase in the energy mix structure. This 
assumption results in a fall in particulate matter emissions in the first decade despite the 
increase in energy use (see Eqs. 11-13). After that, rising demands from the growth of 
energy use will dominate, and particulate matter emissions will rise again. Projected SO2 
emissions will rise much faster than particulates due to a less optimistic estimate in 
emission factors jxσ  and jxfψ . However, we still project some improvement in terms of 
sulfur emission abatement. For example, coal use rises at 3.0% per year while SO2 
emissions rise only at 2.1% over the 30-year period. The transportation sector is projected 
to grow rapidly and with it, NOX emissions. Under our pessimistic assumption of only 
little improvement in NOX emission factors, NOx emissions will grow at 4.41% per year 
over the next thirty years.  
Our base case estimate of premature mortality is 91,000 deaths in 2000, and the 
average annual growth rate is about 3.4% for the next thirty years, which is slightly higher 
than the growth rate of energy use. The value of health damages grows at about the same 
magnitude as premature deaths, though slightly higher since the income elasticity of WTP 
is positive. The ratio of health damages to GDP indicates that health damages per capita 
national income would also rise quite rapidly from only 1.71% in 2000 to 2.5% in 2010, 
and 3.50% in 2030.   
 
4.2   Forecast on the Future Rural-Urban Migration Flow and Scenario Design  
In addition to the economy, energy use and environmental quality, we also need to 
project the future rural and urban labor market in the base case, thus we can have a 
baseline for comparing it with counterfactual tax simulations. We consider three base case 
scenarios. The first scenario is the “business as usual” scenario assuming that the Chinese 
government will keep the current moderate migration policy. Thus, we can forecast the 
future migration flow based on historical data. We also consider two alternative trends of 
future migration flow as well. For example, in the second scenario, we assume a lower 
rural-urban mobility which suggests that a stringent migration policy may take place. In 
the third scenario, we assume a higher rural-urban mobility which suggests that a loose 
migration policy may take place. The latter two cases are just for purposes of sensitivity 
analysis.  
For the business as usual scenario, we forecast the future urban-rural wage 
differential based on the historical trend. Firstly, it is important for us to understand past 
migration evolution and its causes. Before the economic reform in 1978, the average 
migration rate in China was only 0.24, far below the world average of 1.84 from 1950-
1990 (Zhao 2000). The people’s commune system and “hukou” policy severely hindered 
the urbanization process in China (Zhao 2003).  After 1978, the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS) emerged and greatly increased productivity in the agricultural sector, 
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which generated surplus labor in the rural area. The surplus of rural labor in migration 
literature is often viewed as the main “push” factor that drives the rural-urban migration 
flow. Figures 2 and 3 give the historical trend of rural population, labor force and rural-
urban migrants. Although since 1990 the rural population has stabilized and even declined 
after 1994, the rural labor force still increased very fast, for example the total number of 
workers increased by 14%, thereby creating a huge rural labor surplus. On the other hand, 
in urban areas, there were also “pull” factors in the rural-urban migration process, such as 
industrial economic reform and the development of special economic zones, the 
expansion of the non-state informal and service sectors, and the economic structure shift 
from capital intensive sectors to labor intensive sectors.  
Both “push” and “pull” factors contributed to the increasing number of rural-urban 
migrants. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the historical trend of rural migrants from 1989 to 
2000. In 1989, the migrants were only 8.9 million. This number almost tripled in 2000 to 
about 27 million. The “hukou” policy started in the 1960s and only relaxed very recently. 
From 1984 to 1988, the Chinese government started to allow rural workers to enter the 
urban areas on condition that they could provide food for themselves (Zhao 2003). Since 
the emergence of the “rural migrant wave” in 1989, the government interfered and 
restricted migration for fear that it would threaten the existing “hukou” system. After 
further rapid economic growth and increasing labor demand in the coastal cities in the 
early nineties, the central government began to relax its migration policy and to some 
degree, encourage the rural-urban migration, so we can see that the growth rate of rural-
urban migration is very high for the period of 1989-1994, about 21% per year. From 1994 
to 2000, due to pressure from layoffs and unemployment problems in the urban areas, the 
Chinese government started to tighten its control on the migration flow again (Zhao 
2003). Thus the growth rate of rural-urban migrants declined to about 2.3% annually.  In 
our business as usual scenario, we assume our future migrant flow will keep to an annual 
rate of 2.2% until 2030, about the same rate following the period 1994-2000. In Figure 4, 
we also give the future trend of rural migrants in the business as usual case, i.e. assuming 
that the Chinese government will sustain the current moderate migration policy. 
Figure 5 shows the future trend of migration under three different labor mobility 
scenarios. We assume a 2.2% average annual growth rate of migrants in the business as 
usual scenario, a 2.7% average annual growth rate for a high labor mobility scenario, and 
a 1.5% average annual growth rate for a low labor mobility scenario. Thus, we can 
compare the counterfactual fuel tax and output cases with their corresponding base cases, 
under different labor mobility assumptions, and see how the imposition of new 
environmental taxes affect the whole economy, environment quality, and in particular, the 





Figure 2. Rural population and labor force 
 
Figure 3. Rural-urban migrants (1989-1998) 
Data Source: Zhao(2003), Table 1; National Bureau of Statistics of China (2002), Table 4-1, Table 5-4, 
Table 12-3; Sicular and Zhao (2002), Table 2.3.  
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5.0 SIMULATION RESULTS 
  
In the counterfactual environmental tax simulation, similar to the tax policies proposed in 
Ho and Jorgenson (2007) and Cao, Ho and Jorgenson (2005), we examine two sets of 
environmental tax policies. The first is fuel tax, which is a tax on primary fuels, and the 
tax rate is set as proportional to the average damage per unit of fuel use.  The second is 
output tax, which is a tax on sector output, and the tax rate is set as proportional to the 
marginal health damages caused by emissions released from the production of the 
commodities in each sector.  
 
5.1   Fuel Tax Simulation 
 Although a ton of coal use in different sectors will produce different levels of 
emissions and damages depending on sectoral specifics, a sector-specific fuel tax does not 
seem plausible to implement. Thus in our model we assume an equal tax rate for the same 
type of fuel use in all the sectors, and the national tax rate is set as proportional to the 
average marginal damage per unit of fuel use (AMDft) over all the sectors (see Table 8). 
This will still cause producers to internalize the damages by choosing less fuel 
consumption or shifting to cleaner fuels. 
 










AMD        (f = coal, oil, gas; j =1, 2, …, 33)         (27) 
where  is the average marginal damage of fuel f, is the marginal damage of 




Table 8. Health damages from fuels, 2000 
  Average Marginal Damage (AMDft)  xvft  
  (yuan per unit fuel)  (yuan of damage 
     per yuan of fuel) 
 Coal 108.62 yuan/ton  0.6754 
 Oil 64.56 yuan/ton  0.0143 
 Gas 0.50 yuan/1000m3  0.0005 
Source: author’s own calculations 
 
From Table 8, we can see that the fuel tax is mainly imposed on coal and oil use, 
while taxes on gas can be ignored since the damage per yuan of gas use is almost zero. 
Similar to the argument in Ho and Jorgenson (2007) and Cao, Ho and Jorgenson (2005), 
the damage rate for coal use is very high and a full tax equal to the average marginal 
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damage per ton of coal use is unlikely to be adopted by the government, so we set a 
moderate 30% of their estimated health damage for our counterfactual fuel tax simulations 
here, i.e. 3.0=λ . 
  ftjt AMDtf λ=               ( j =coal, oil, gas)                           (28) 
The effects of the fuel tax on the economy, urban and rural wage rate, pollution 
emissions and associated health damages for the first and last year are given in Table 9. In 
our fuel tax simulation, the overall environmental tax burden is relatively small, only 
about 1.5-1.7% of the total tax revenue, thereby we expect the overall effect on the whole 
economy to be also very small. We find that the real GDP has a small decline at 0.01% in 
the first year. But the environmental tax has positive effects on the real GDP in the long 
run, for example, in the 30th year, we find a positive impact of 0.01%. In our simulation, 
we assume a revenue neutrality here, which means when we impose a new environmental 
tax on fuel uses, we cut the other taxes, such as value added tax, capital income tax and 
sales tax proportionally to achieve the same tax revenue as in the base case. Since the 
capital income tax is cut in the counterfactual case, we can see there is a positive impact 
on the investment over the next 30 years. This is accompanied by a slight fall in real 
consumption of both urban and rural households, but the negative impacts will decrease 
with time. Similar to the results of Ho and Jorgenson (2007), since the fuel tax revenue is 
very small, the offsetting cuts for value added taxes and capital income tax are also small.  
In our two-representative household model simulation, after the fuel tax, we find 
that the average migrant peasants’ wage rate will decrease by 0.20% in the first year and 
0.17% in the last year. The ratio of migrants’ wage rate versus rural wage rate will 
decrease by 0.06% in the first year and 0.05% in the last year. From equation (23), we 
find that at equilibrium, the migrant flow will also decrease by 0.09% in the first year and 
0.07% in the 30th year. Thus, after the fuel tax implementation, we find the migration flow 
is reduced, although the impact is very small. In addition, the impact of the fuel tax on 
migration is smaller in the 30th year than in the first year. 
We now turn to the impacts of the fuel tax on environmental quality and health 
damages. After the fuel tax, from the simulation we can see that the industry structure and 
the choice of fuels will be significantly affected. The energy-intensive sectors will shrink 
as a whole after the fuel tax, and other sectors will relatively expand due to the 
equilibrium effects. Within each sector, there is an input substitution effect which reduces 
the value share of energy uses, or the whole energy structure shifts from coal use to oil 
use, or oil use to gas use. These effects will eventually reduce pollution emissions and 
associated health damages.  
In our simulation, the total primary particulate matter will reduce by 6.4-9.3%. 
Sulfur dioxide emissions have a large 10.0-13.9% reduction. Due to the small tax on oil 
use, the NOX emissions from transportation only decline by the rate of 0.6-1.2%. The 
large reductions in sulfur dioxide and primary particulate matters will generate a large 
reduction of 19.6-21.4% in premature deaths, and about 10.3-13.9% reduction in the value 
of health damages. The value of reduced damages accounts for a large 0.2-0.4% of GDP, 
compared to the base case total damages of 1.7-3.5% of GDP.  
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Table 9. Effects of fuel tax on the economic performance, rural-urban migration               
and health damages 
Variable Effect in 1st Year Effect in 30th
  Year 
Real GDP -0.01% +0.01% 
Consumption (Urban Household) -0.10% -0.04% 
Consumption (Rural Household) -0.06% -0.00% 
Investment +0.13% +0.26% 
Migrants’ Wage Rate  -0.20% -0.17% 
Migrants’-Rural Wage Ratio -0.06% -0.05% 
Migration Flow -0.09% -0.07% 
Coal use -12.90% -17.30% 
Carbon emissions -10.26% -13.20% 
Primary particulate emissions -6.38% -9.27% 
SO2 emissions  -9.98% -13.90% 
NOx (transportation)  -0.58% -1.15% 
Premature Deaths -19.60% -21.39% 
Value of Health Damages -10.29% -13.88% 
Change in other tax rates -1.91% -1.80% 
Reduction in Damages/GDP  0.18% 0.44% 
Pollution tax/Total tax revenue 1.74% 1.55% 
   
 
Figure 6 gives the impacts of fuel tax on sectoral output in the first year 
simulation. From this we can see how a fuel tax changes the size of different sectors 
through economy-wide general equilibrium effects.  Since fuel tax is only imposed on fuel 
use, thus energy intensive sectors such as coal mining and process have the highest 
impact, and will reduce output by 13%; electricity, steam and hot water, and gas 
production and supply are also significantly impacted by reduced outputs of about 2%. On 
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Figure 6. Impacts of fuel tax on sectoral output in the first year simulation 
 
5.2   Output Tax Simulation 
 Our second policy proposal imposes a tax on the gross output of each sector, and 
the output tax rate is set in proportion to local health damages caused by the marginal unit 
of output. In our model simulation, as in Ho and Jorgenson (2007) and Cao, Ho and 
Jorgenson (2005), we assume a tax on output equal to the marginal damage ( ) with OjtMD
1=λ  (see Eq. 29). The marginal damage of PM10, SO2 and NOx, and total marginal 
damages of all the 33 industries in the base year 2000 are presented in Table 10. We also 
provide the total environmental damages as well as their shares in the total damages in the 
last two columns. The output tax will increase the commodity price that internalizes the 
pollution externalities, thus consumers or intermediate input users will pay higher prices 
for products from the dirty sectors than for those from the clean sectors. Since the impacts 
are not directly imposed on the producers, the tax is not the most efficient, but in reality it 
is easy to implement for the state and local environmental agencies, since it produces 
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smaller changes on prices and incomes, and the impacts will spread broadly to other 
sectors.  
                 (29) Ojt
x
jt MDt λ=
 Given the estimate of marginal damages for all the 33 sectors, the output tax only 
slightly increases the commodity price, for example, the electricity price increases by 
about 3.2%; for non-metal mineral products, by about 3.4%; and for metals, construction, 
and health, education, other service sectors, by about 0.6-0.8%. Table 11 gives the 
economy-wide effects of using these output taxes for the first and last years. Now we can 
see that the output tax has a positive impact on real GDP, although there is a tiny decline 
in the first year. The consumption of both urban and rural households increases in the 
counterfactual cases, rural households faster than urban ones. Different from the fuel tax, 
output tax has a higher impact on investment, starting from 0.2% increase in the first year 
to a very high increase of 2.0% in the last year, compared to base case simulations. This is 
due to the higher tax revenue collected from the output tax, about 7.6%-14.3% of total tax 
revenue, thus the “revenue recycling effect” is also larger than the fuel tax case.  
 In our output tax simulations, we find that the migrants’ wage rate will decrease by 
0.77% in the first year and decrease by 1.44% in the last year. The ratio of migrants’ rural 
wage will decrease, about 0.45% in the first year and 1.03% in the last year. Based on our 
migration equation (22), at equilibrium, the migration flow will decrease by 0.60% in the 
first year, and by 1.37% in the last year. Therefore similar to the fuel tax simulation, in the 
output tax case, the migration flow will also be discouraged, but the impacts are larger 
than for the fuel tax case. 
 After imposing the output tax, the coal use will decrease by 3.5% in the first year 
and 10.2% in the last year. Similar to the trend of coal use, carbon emissions have smaller 
impact for about 3.0% decrease in the first year and 8.1% in the last year. The changes in 
the fuel use lead to a reduction in primary particulate matter emissions of 3.3% in the first 
year and 7.9% in the last year. The reduction of SO2 emissions is similar to that of 
particulate matter, but has a larger impact in the 30th year. NOX from the transportation 
sector is reduced by 3.1% in first year and 7.8% in the last year given a sizable output tax 
in that sector. We can see that, very different from the fuel tax case, the impact on the 






Table 10. Marginal sector health damage (yuan of damage per yuan of output), 2000 
















(mil yuan)  
% 
     
1  Agriculture 0.00003 0.00037 0.00041 1,076 0.72 
2  Coal mining and processing 0.00334 0.00353 0.00686 1,673 1.12 
3  Crude petroleum mining 0.00022 0.00037 0.00059 242 0.16 
4  Natural Gas Mining 0.00002 0.00014 0.00016 4 0.00 
5  Metal ore mining 0.00219 0.00199 0.00418 409 0.27 
6  Non-ferrous mineral mining 0.00101 0.00176 0.00277 387 0.26 
7  Food products and tobacco 0.00107 0.00167 0.00275 4,023 2.68 
8  Textile goods 0.00060 0.00141 0.00201 2,229 1.49 
9  Apparel, leather 0.00009 0.00014 0.00023 139 0.09 
10  Sawmills and furniture 0.00115 0.00103 0.00218 326 0.22 
11  Paper products, printing  0.00233 0.00407 0.00640 3,141 2.10 
12  Petroleum processing & coking 0.00069 0.00037 0.00105 837 0.56 
13  Chemical 0.00132 0.00278 0.00409 8,832 5.89 
14  Nonmetal mineral products 0.01943 0.01343 0.03287 20,624 13.76 
15  Metals smelting and pressing 0.00283 0.00314 0.00597 6,879 4.59 
16  Metal products 0.00043 0.00097 0.00140 587 0.39 
17  Machinery and equipment 0.00042 0.00056 0.00098 888 0.59 
18  Transport equipment 0.00014 0.00033 0.00047 482 0.32 
19  Electrical machinery 0.00010 0.00021 0.00031 310 0.21 
20 
 Electronic & telecom. 
Equipment 0.00002 0.00009 0.00011 131 0.09 
21  Instruments 0.00011 0.00021 0.00032 31 0.02 
22  Other manufacturing  0.00014 0.00028 0.00042 77 0.05 
23  Electricity, steam & hot water 0.00828 0.03829 0.04657 39,692 26.48 
24  Gas production and supply 0.00166 0.00252 0.00418 158 0.11 
25  Construction 0.00233 0.00146 0.00379 8,403 5.61 
26  Transport and warehousing 0.00874 0.01266 0.02140 14,503 9.67 
27  Post & telecommunication 0.00018 0.00009 0.00027 102 0.07 
28  Commerce & Restaurants 0.00140 0.00068 0.00208 4,201 2.80 
29  Finance and insurance 0.00044 0.00026 0.00071 365 0.24 
30  Real estate 0.00714 0.00376 0.01090 3,229 2.15 
31  Social services 0.00451 0.00271 0.00722 5,837 3.89 
32 
 Health, Education, other 
services 0.00615 0.00322 0.00937 8,275 5.52 
33  Public administration 0.00327 0.00187 0.00514 3,015 2.01 
  Households    8,797 5.87 






Table 11. Effects of output tax on the economic performance, rural-urban migration and 
health damages 
Variable Effect in 1st Year Effect in 30th Year
 Year Year 
Real GDP -0.01% +0.30% 
Consumption (Urban Household) +0.07% +0.09% 
Consumption (Rural Household) +0.10% +0.12% 
Investment +0.16% +2.02% 
Migrants’ Wage Rate  -0.77% -1.44% 
Migrants’-Rural Wage Ratio -0.45% -1.03% 
Migration Flow -0.60% -1.37% 
Coal use -3.45% -10.19% 
Carbon emissions -2.95% -8.10% 
Primary particulate emissions -3.32% -7.89% 
SO2 emissions  -3.33% -10.75% 
NOx (transportation)  -3.08% -7.78% 
Premature Deaths -2.95% -5.84% 
Value of Health Damages -2.69% -8.31% 
Change in other tax rates -7.57% -7.95% 
Reduction in Damages/GDP  0.05% 0.26% 
Pollution tax/Total tax revenue 7.58% 14.30% 
   
 
The effect of these reductions in both primary and secondary particulates is to 
lower premature deaths by 3.0% in the first year and 5.8% in the last year, and also to 
reduce the value of health damages by 2.7% and 8.3% respectively in the two years. The 
value of this reduction in damages in the first year comes to about 0.05% of GDP, and 
about 0.26% of GDP for the 30th year.   
Figure 7 gives the impacts of output tax on sectoral output in the first year. Very 
different from the fuel tax, we see that many sectors are negatively impacted under the 
output tax. Therefore, it has a broader impact on the manufacturing sectors than fuel tax. 
Coal mining and electricity are still the most impacted, but in smaller magnitudes 
compared to the impacts under the fuel tax case. In addition, many other sectors such as 
transportation, non-metal mineral products, metals, chemical, and some service sectors are 
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also more affected than in the fuel tax case. In particular, construction, transportation, and 
other manufacturing sectors, in which many rural migrants work, are also undergoing 
negative impacts.  
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Figure 7. Impacts of output tax on sectoral output in the first year simulation 
 
 
5.3   Sensitivity Analysis 
 We simulate fuel tax and output tax under three labor mobility scenarios. Figures 
8-11 show both the absolute and relative changes in the migration population under the 
counterfactual taxation policy for different base case scenarios.  
 In Figure 8, for all the base case scenarios, we find fuel tax will actually 
discourage the migration flow as the absolute migrant population changes range from 0.02 
million to about 0.035 million over the next 30 years. If we calculate the relative changes, 
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i.e. the changes in migration population divided by the total migration population in 
different base case scenarios, we find the relative percentage change ranges from -0.1% to 
-0.05% (Figure 9). Comparing the absolute number of migrants and relative percentage 
changes, we find although the absolute changes increase over time, the relative impacts of 
fuel tax on the migration process gradually decline with time in the long run. Allowing for 
higher rural-urban labor mobility, we find the absolute change on the migration 
population is larger, but it is smaller in relative terms. Similarly, under the low rural-urban 
labor mobility scenario, the absolute change is smaller, but relative change is larger.  
 We also conduct counterfactual output tax under three labor mobility base case 
scenarios, and the results are shown in Figures 10 and 11. Similar to our fuel tax results, 
we find that the output tax will also have a negative impact on the rural-urban migration 
flow, ranging from -0.1 to -0.8 million population in fixed absolute terms, or -0.6% to -
1.7% in relative percentage terms. Thus the relative change of output tax will increase 
over time, opposite to the fuel tax. The impacts of output tax are much higher than the fuel 
tax case. If we allow higher rural-urban labor mobility, also similar to the fuel tax case, 
we find the absolute change on the migration population is larger, but it is smaller in 
relative terms. Similarly, under the low rural-urban labor mobility scenario, the absolute 




























Figure 8. Absolute changes in rural-urban migrants of fuel tax simulation under three 




























Figure 9. Relative changes in rural-urban migrants of fuel tax simulation under three 





























Figure 10. Absolute changes in rural-urban migrants of output tax simulation under three 





























Figure 11. Relative changes in rural-urban migrants of output tax simulation under three 
scenarios (Business As Usual (BAU), high labor mobility, low labor mobility)  
 
 
6.0  CONCLUSIONS 
 Since the adoption of economic reform and open-door policies introduced in 1978, 
China has experienced dramatic economic growth and rapid urbanization especially in the 
last two decades. On one hand, there is a rapid increase in agricultural productivity, 
generating a huge labor surplus in the rural area, the so-called “push” factor in the rural-
urban migration flow. On the other hand, the expansion of non-state labor intensive 
sectors and industrialization has created a demand for rural migrants, becoming a “pull 
factor” to drive the migration flow. Due to these two primary reasons, the old household 
registration “hukou” system is gradually breaking down as more and more peasants flow 
into urban areas. The quantity of rural-urban migration almost tripled during the decade 
from the late 80s to the late 90s, whereby in 1989, the migrants were 8.9 million and in 
1999, increased to 27.0 million (Zhao 2003; Sicular and Zhao 2002).  
 At the same time, China is experiencing increasing environmental pollution and 
associated health damages. To curb environmental pollution, the Chinese government is 
planning to implement economic incentive-based instruments, in particular, an 
environmental taxation policy. Western literature suggests that an environmental taxation 
policy might interfere with labor market distortions, thus creating negative “tax 
interaction effects” (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Parry 1995; Goulder 1995; 
Bovenberg and Goulder 2002). However, unlike western countries, China currently has a 
very special labor market. As a whole, we can treat the labor supply as fixed, thus labor 
distortions will not arise from entering or exiting of the labor market as in the western 
countries. However, due to the government “hukou” system and recent relaxed migration 
policy, an environmental tax may interfere with spatial labor allocations, bringing about 
additional distortions to pre-existing labor market distortions, in particular in terms of 
rural-urban allocation inefficiencies.  
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 To shed some light on this issue, we introduced a recursive dynamic two-
representative household CGE model with both an environmental module and a rural-
urban migration module to examine the counterfactual environmental taxation policy and 
the rural-urban migration process. Our simulations suggest that both fuel tax and output 
tax will negatively impact on the rural-urban migration flow, and the output tax seems to 
have a larger effect. To further understand the reasoning behind these simulation results, 
we can decompose the net effect into the following three mechanisms: 
 
1) Industry Scale Partial Equilibrium Effect 
First, let’s consider the partial equilibrium world where the environmental tax 
policies only affect a single sector without interacting with other sectors through changes 
in the factor input markets and commodity markets. Since the energy tax is imposed on 
energy use, the rise in energy input prices will result in a substitution of labor for energy. 
In our CGE model, we assume Cobb-Douglas production functions, therefore labor inputs 
will increase and result in a decline in wages in those sectors. For output tax, in which 
case the tax is imposed on the output price, the relative factor price does not change, 
substitution effect is zero, thus in theory, wage rates will not be affected for the output tax 
case. 
 
2) Revenue Recycling – Changes in Value Added Tax Rates 
 In our environmental tax policy simulation, we assumed a “revenue neutral” 
condition. This means that in order to keep total tax revenue fixed as the base case, we cut 
all other pre-existing taxes proportionally after we impose a new environmental tax. Thus 
the value added labor tax was deducted too, and resulted in an increase in the after-tax 
wage rate of all the rural and urban workers for both fuel tax and output tax cases. 
 
3) General Equilibrium Scale Effects   
In our migration module, we calculated the migration flow based on the wage gap 
between the migrants’ wages and rural wages. In the counterfactual scenarios where 
environmental tax policies are implemented, we can use our CGE model to measure the 
economy-wide economic structural changes for each sector. For example, in the fuel tax 
simulation, we find that the energy-intensive sectors are highly impacted and may thus 
shrink in size, while other cleaner manufacturing and service sectors will expand. In the 
output tax simulation, the impacts were smaller for individual pollution-intensive sectors, 
but tax impacts were spread to many other sectors; thus the users of pollution-intensive 
outputs will need to pay higher commodity prices. In sum, due to these more complex 
general equilibrium effects, the impacts on migration flow cannot be predicted in 
analytical terms.   
 Therefore, because of the different directions and uncertain general equilibrium 
effects, it is difficult to identify the net direction of the urban wage rate relative to the 
rural wage rate analytically. Using our simple two-representative household CGE model, 
our simulations can shed some light on the overall effects of fuel tax and output tax. We 
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find that both fuel tax and output tax decrease the wage gaps and discourage rural-urban 
migration flow. The impact of fuel tax is smaller than that of output tax on the migration 
process. From the partial equilibrium analysis, we know that the substitution effect would 
drive down the labor wage rate in the fuel tax case, while the substitution effect would be 
zero in the output tax case. We considered the impact of the reduction of value added 
labor taxes – both rural and urban after-VAT tax labor wage would increase, but the net 
impact on the ratio of migrants’ rural wage gap would still be uncertain as we do not 
know the magnitude and so cannot determine the net direction. Considering the economy-
wide general equilibrium effects, since we are focusing on the average migrants’ wage 
rather than the average urban wage rate, the general equilibrium economic structure 
change and the base case distribution of migrants in manufacturing sectors together 
determine the net effects. In the output tax, the tax impacts are broader and many migrant-
intensive sectors are negatively impacted, such as transportation, construction, and some 
service sectors. This might drive down the expected wage rate of migrants, while in the 
fuel tax case very few sectors are affected15 and the general equilibrium effects will be 
small.  
 We also conducted sensitivity analyses for our environmental tax simulations 
under various labor mobility projection scenarios. We find that for both fuel tax and 
output tax, the absolute changes increased over time. However, in terms of relative 
percentage changes in migration compared with the base case scenario, the impacts of fuel 
tax on the migration process decline over time, while the impacts of output tax increase 
over time. For both fuel tax and output tax, for high labor mobility, the changes in the 
absolute number of migrants were larger, but the relative percentage changes were smaller 
compared with the business as usual scenario, and vice versa for low labor mobility; the 
absolute changes in the number of migrants were smaller, but the relative changes were 
larger.  
Let us return to the discussions on the “revenue recycling effects” and the “tax 
interaction effects” in the second-best world, as well as the “double dividend” hypothesis 
debated in previous environmental tax literature.  In our model simulations, we find strong 
“revenue recycling effects” in our counterfactual tax simulations; the effects are relatively 
higher than for the output tax policy. As for the “tax interaction effects”, many Chinese 
CGE models ignored these by assuming an inelastic labor supply, thus the “double 
dividend” results would always hold due to the positive “revenue recycling effects”.  
Unlike previous Chinese CGE models and environmental tax simulations, 
however, we model a two-representative rural-urban household CGE model, and 
explicitly calculate the average migrants’ wage rate to compare it with the rural wage rate 
in our simulations. We find that the wage differential decreased after the imposition of the 
environmental tax, resulting in a subsequent fall in the migrant flow to the industrial 
sectors. Most of the economic development and urbanization literature suggests that there 
is a welfare gain from a smooth urbanization process, so in other words, precipitating the 
rural-urban labor flow will reduce labor market distortions and improve economic 
efficiency. Based on this argument, our simulation suggests that environmental tax might 
                                                 
15 In the fuel tax case, coal mining, electricity sectors are highly impacted, but very few peasant migrants are 
working in these sectors. 
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further distort this spatial labor market and migration flow process, and increase the 
deadweight loss. Therefore, it is important to incorporate these special effects into the 
assessment of the full economic costs and benefits for the environmental tax reform in 
China, and to revisit the previous “double dividend” results. Our model suggests that by 
imposing a moderate fuel tax and output tax as simulated in this study, the “tax interaction 
effects” are likely to be small, thus the “double dividend” would still hold.  
Comparing the impacts of fuel tax and output tax on the economic system, 
environmental pollution reductions, and rural-urban migration labor market, we find that 
our preferred environmental tax policy would be a fuel tax policy, which will not only 
significantly reduce pollution emissions and decrease health damages, but also result in 
smaller rural-urban migration distortions. On the other hand, although output tax may be 
easy to implement and be more politically feasible, in terms of economic efficiency, a tax 
on the sales of output is less efficient in reducing emissions of either CO2, PM or SO2. 
This is because an output policy provides no incentives for firms to switch to cleaner fuels 
or to install scrubbers. On the other hand, in the output tax case, we find this tax will have 
more impact on the migrant-intensive sectors such as construction, transportation and 
some service sectors, greatly affecting the rural-urban migration process and thus creating 
higher “spatial labor market distortions”.  
Overall, our analysis illustrates how the CGE model can be a valuable tool for 
evaluating the effects of environmental policies on the economic-environment system as 
well as their impacts on the rural-urban migration process. However, several caveats 
should be mentioned. First, the model used here is a stylized simplification of the Chinese 
economy and we only modeled the migration process from rural to urban. We did not 
model the off-farm activities in the rural areas due to data limitations. Off-farm activities 
can be treated as lower transaction costs to the migrants, but the mechanism for them to 
shift from farming to other rural industries is exactly the same as for the rural-urban 
migration process. Thus, we would expect to get similar results. Secondly, our model does 
not model the detailed job searching process, but is based on a simple Harris and Todaro 
migration model. Finally, as in many other CGE models, numerous parameters in our 
model are calibrated on the base year observations of data, rather than using time series 
econometric estimations. Thus our results need to be interpreted with caution in terms of 
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